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Abstract
The 1991 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth contains detailed information on
how respondents acquired their main residence and any other real estate. This information
is used to estimate the impact of inter vivos transfers on the saving period required to
purchase a house and on the value of the house purchased when households have limited
access to mortgage markets. It is found that transfers shorten the saving time by about two
years and allow households to purchase considerably larger homes. The results have
implications for the debate about the source of the relation between aggregate saving and
growth.
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1. Introduction
Private transfers are the chief mode of economic interaction between
family members, and as such they can help maintain or reduce disparities in
wealth and consumption. Depending on their nature, private transfer
decisions can significantly affect the ultimate impact of changes in social
security legislation, government debt and transfer policies. Well-timed
transfers can make up for insurance and credit market failures and overcome
the distortions in the allocation of consumption over time and states of
nature induced by financial market imperfections. Accordingly,
intergenerational transfers are receiving increasing attention in the policy
debate.
Despite their importance to an understanding of households' interactions,
the empirical evidence on the effect of transfers on recipients' behavior is
scant. In this paper we rely on Italian data drawn from the 1991 Bank of
Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to determine the
effect of gifts and other transfers earmarked for real estate on households'
behavior. The magnitude of this effect carries important implications
concerning the relation between aggregate saving and growth. As stressed
by Deaton (1996), in the presence of a downpayment constraint, saving for
house purchases is analogous to saving for retirement. Since in both cases
saving occurs before dissaving, in a growing economy the average age of
each dollar saved will be less than the average age of each dollar dissaved.
Aggregation over households with different propensities to save then leads
to the well-documented positive correlation between aggregate saving and
growth (Carroll and Weil, 1994). Transfers could allow households to
purchase homes earlier in life, thus lowering the average age of each dollar
saved and reducing the positive effect of growth on saving. In order to
understand if mortgage market imperfections can potentially account for the
saving-growth link it becomes crucial to establish whether gifts earmarked
for real estate are widespread and if they affect the timing of home
purchases.
In Section 2 we discuss how intergenerational transfers affect the
decision to purchase a house. If they come early in life, bequests (whether
intended or involuntary) and gifts directly reduce the time required to save
enough to purchase a house. Monetary transfers provide additional resources
for home purchase: they increase own funds, make it possible to meet the
downpayment or cut saving time. Transfers in kind may have similar effects3
if the house is acquired from parents or relatives below the market price.
The 1991 SHIW contains a special section in which respondents provide
information on how they acquired their main residence and any other real
estate, which we use in Section 3 to construct an indicator of the share of
transfers in total real estate wealth in order to assess the relevance of
earmarked intergenerational transfers. In the presence of mortgage market
imperfections, which are particularly severe in Italy, private transfers affect
households' opportunities to become homeowners in various ways.
The survey also allows us to construct a proxy for the number of years
during which a household saves before purchasing a home. Using duration
models, in Section 4 this variable is then related to demographic variables,
permanent income, an index of regional real estate prices and the value of
transfers received. Particular attention is paid to the potential bias arising
from censored observations. It is found that transfers shorten saving time by
about two years (20 percent of the average time for owners). Section 5
shows that this result is robust under various assumptions, in particular with
regard to the potential endogeneity of transfers and the effect of time-
varying regressors. In Section 6 we find that transfers increase substantially
the value of the house purchased. Section 7 summarizes the results.
2. Transfers and borrowing constraints
The size of intergenerational transfers is clearly important in analyzing
the process of wealth accumulation. Given capital market imperfections,
however, the timing of transfers also matters, not just their amount. In fact,
the gain in utility from receiving a transfer earmarked for real estate late in
life may be very limited compared with the benefit of receiving the same
transfer in periods in which the consumer is credit constrained.
Artle and Varaya (1978) show that mortgage market imperfections can
distort the household consumption profile and lead to serious welfare losses:
borrowing constraints in fact force even impatient consumers to reduce
consumption early in life in order to accumulate enough assets for the
downpayment and enjoy the benefits of ownership. Furthermore, the length
of the time over which consumption is compressed is longer the higher the4
downpayment and the lower the initial amount of assets.
1 Cox(1990) argues
that inter vivos transfers, such as financial support from parents or friends,
can help individuals constrained in the consumption loan market to raise
current consumption.
2
For the same reason, timely intergenerational transfers can overcome
imperfections in the mortgage market by reducing the saving time required
to purchase the house, during which consumption is constrained;
alternatively, given saving time, transfers allow an increase in current
consumption. Since severe mortgage market constraints may discourage
individuals from buying altogether, transfers can turn potential tenants into
owners. For this to be the case, transfers must take place relatively early in
life; only in this case do transfers offset the reduction in utility during the
saving period, i.e. the reason why individuals may choose to remain tenants.
Late, unexpected transfers might be of little help if they come when a large
chunk of lifetime resources has already been consumed.
In short, if timed correctly, transfers could reduce the distortions in the
intertemporal allocation of consumption induced by mortgage market
imperfections. In the absence of such imperfections, individuals who wish
to purchase a house could borrow early in life and repay the mortgage over a
long period, which in principle could extend over the entire life. In the
presence of borrowing restrictions, households are fully or partly prevented
and discouraged from borrowing and must save for the downpayment or for
1 Assume that the real interest rate r equals the rate of time preference, and that earnings are
constant over the life-cycle, so that optimal consumption and saving are both constant. Let a(t)
denote accumulated assets up to age t, s optimal savings (defined as the constant level of non-
interest income net of rents minus optimal consumption) over the saving period necessary to meet
the downpayment bP, where 1-b is the share of the house price P that can be financed by
borrowing, and T the optimal saving time. Optimal saving time is then given by the condition












a(0)<bP is the initial level of assets. For given s, T is increasing in bP and decreasing in a(0). If
the initial endowment a(0) is interpreted as a transfer taking place at t=0, its effect is to reduce
saving time for any given saving rate. Obviously, if part of the transfer is used to increase current
consumption, the effect on saving time is attenuated.
2 Guiso and Jappelli (1991) report that some transfers in Italy are targeted towards liquidity-
constrained households, which is consistent with the hypothesis that informal markets can ease
borrowing constraints. However, since such transfers are not common, most households remain
liquidity-constrained even after private transfers have been made. The results of this paper are
broadly consistent with this study.5
outright purchase. Even if family transfers can help overcome the incentive
and information problems that are at the root of credit market imperfections,
they cannot entirely substitute for a fully efficient credit market (Altig and
Davis, 1989). It is therefore important to establish empirically how far
private transfers can go in offsetting capital market imperfections.
These issues are particularly important in Italy: the mortgage market is
characterized by short maturities (10-15 years is the standard), high interest
rate spreads, and downpayments often well above 50 percent. Several
factors can account for these imperfections: regulations requiring minimum
downpayments of 50 percent of the value of the house, limited competition
between financial intermediaries, asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders, and transaction costs.
3
Legal costs further inhibit the functioning of mortgage markets. The
process of repossessing collateral is extremely cumbersome in Italy, due to
the length of the judicial process and various protections accorded to
debtors. On average, it takes 5.5 years for a bank to repossess the collateral
(4 years in the North and 6.6 years in the South, due to geographical
differences in the inefficiency of the courts). Net of legal costs, the average
share of the mortgage repossessed in case of default is below 60 percent of
the value of the loan granted (Generale and Gobbi, 1996).
A crude but striking indicator of the mortgage markets' imperfections is
simply the size of the market. In 1991 only 10.2 percent of the households
interviewed reported having mortgage debt; on average, outstanding
housing liabilities represent only 2.4 percent of the gross value of the house.
The size of mortgages is also modest: only 1.6 percent of homeowners had
outstanding loans greater than 60 percent of the value of the property.
4
Focusing on recent home buyers (305 households that purchased a house in
1991), only 11.2 percent have a mortgage in excess of 40 percent of the
value of the house (2.3 percent in excess of 60 percent); and 65 percent
report no mortgage liability. These features of the mortgage market do not
discourage Italians from becoming homeowners. In fact, the overall home
ownership rate rose from 46 percent in 1961 to 59 percent in 1981 and over
3 The minimum downpayment was lowered to 25 percent in 1987, and the compulsory minimum
was abolished in June 1995.
4 This suggests that in many cases the purpose of housing loans is to finance repairs and additions,
rather than a purchase; the SHIW does not distinguish between the two types of loans.6
62 percent in 1991. However, borrowing constraints in the mortgage market
dramatically affect the average age at which the house is purchased.
Figure 1 plots the cross-sectional homeownership rate by age.
5 The rate
increases very slowly with age, peaking just before retirement, implying that
for the majority of households the saving period before home ownership
(i.e., the renting period) is substantial.
6 The pattern contrasts sharply with
other countries, where the home ownership rate peaks much earlier. This is
borne out by the average age of first-time buyers: 28 and 29 in the U.S. and
UK, respectively, in 1985 as against 41 in Italy in 1991.
Potentially, there is ample role for transfers to affect housing purchase
decisions. But to be effective, transfers have to be well timed. Only by
chance can bequests serve this purpose. Deliberately overcoming borrowing
constraints requires inter vivos transfers during the renting period in which
the household is saving to buy the house. After receiving a transfer, a
household that plans to purchase a house has various options. Since the
transfer substitutes for own savings, it can choose to save less each period,
keeping 'saving time' and the value of the house constant; it can make a
larger downpayment, thus reducing mortgage debt; it can purchase a larger
house; finally, it can keep own saving, downpayment and the house value
constant, reducing saving time. If there are indivisibilities in housing
purchases, a large transfer may also allow access to a larger or better house
with additional saving effort. In this case saving time may even rise in
response to a transfer, depending on the utility effect of the larger house as
well as on the size of the transfer. Even if these options are not mutually
exclusive, the effect of transfers on saving time is a useful index of the
5 The figure is obtained by plotting the fitted values of a logit regression against a fifth-order
polynomial in age, see the Appendix for details. The data set merges 6 independent cross-sections
(the 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1995 SHIW), a total of about 50,000 observations. We do
not focus just on 1991 (where the age-ownership profile is actually very similar to the one shown
in Figure 1) because in Section 4 we want to compare the cross-sectional profile with a cohort-
adjusted profile.
6  Japan exhibits a pattern of housing tenure by age that is similar to the Italian. Hayashi,
Ito and Slemrod (1988) suggest that the main explanation for the difference between the
much steeper U.S. profile and the Japanese profile is the downpayment required by
creditors. They show, by means of simulations, that a reduction of 20 percentage points
in the downpayment ratio could lower private saving by 2 percentage points of national
income in Japan.7
effectiveness of informal markets in reducing the intertemporal distortions
induced by mortgage market imperfections.
Econometric estimates by Engelhardt and Mayer (1995) based on 1,213
first-time buyers from the Chicago Title and Trust Survey indicate that in
the U.S. transfers primarily increase the amount of the downpayment, and
have little impact on own savings or borrowing. Transfers are also found to
have a negative but small impact on saving time and a strong positive effect
on the value of the house purchased.
3. Definition of transfers
The primary purpose of the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income
and Wealth is to collect detailed data on demographics and households'
income and wealth.
7 The 1991 survey, covering 8,188 households and
24,930 individuals, is representative of the Italian population. There are two
transfer indicators in the SHIW, which we denote as transfers earmarked
for home purchase and general transfers, respectively. We discuss them in
turn.
Respondents provide separate information about the way they acquired
their residence and other real estate.
8 For each property, owned in whole or
in part, households report when they acquired and if it was purchased,
inherited or received as a gift. In case of purchase, they report whether they
received any financial help from parents, relatives or friends in making the
downpayment or outright purchase.
9 If the property was purchased from
parents, relatives or friends, respondents report whether the full market price
7  See Brandolini and Cannari (1994) for discussion of the sample design of the SHIW. The unit of
observation is the household, defined as all persons residing in the same dwelling who are related
by blood, marriage or adoption. The head is defined to be the person who contributes most to
household income (usually the male in nuclear households). The interviews for the 1991 SHIW
were conducted in the Spring of 1992. Flow variables refer to 1991 and stock variables are end-
of-period values. Given the survey design, different households have different probabilities of
being included in the sample. To obtain unbiased estimates of population means, summary
statistics are computed using sample weights.
8 The information refers only to real estate currently owned and thus excludes transfers received in
connection with real estate sold in the past.
9 In the survey “help for downpayment” is not distinguishable from “help for purchase”. Since few
Italian households borrow, “help for downpayment” is likely to have a minor role.8
or a reduced price was paid. The Appendix details the exact wording of the
survey questions.
This information allows us to measure the fraction of households that
received transfers earmarked for home purchase and to divide transfers
(both in kind and monetary) into bequests and inter vivos transfers. Since
our purpose is to measure intergenerational transfers, transfers between
spouses, which account for a substantial portion of bequests, are excluded.
For lack of data no account is taken of intergenerational flows between
individuals living in the same household.
10 In case of gifts or bequests
inheritance taxes are reported and excluded from the measure of transfers.
The first panel of Table 1 shows that the incidence of earmarked transfers
is substantial: about one third of the homeowners received financial support;
11 percent received a bequest, more than 20 percent an inter vivos transfer
(mainly financial support). For second homes the proportion receiving
transfers  is over 50 percent, bequests being the largest source of support. In
total, more than 40 percent of those holding real estate report some form of
intergenerational transfer. The overall incidence of transfers in the total
sample (including non-owners) is 28.1 percent.
The other three panels in Table 1 focus on transfer amounts. For
homeowners (5,142 households, or 62.8 percent of the sample), the average
value of the house is 163.6 million lire; on average, 128.8 million lire (79
percent) derive from own saving, 16.2 million (9.9 percent) from bequests,
and 18.1 million (11.1 percent) from inter vivos transfers (gifts, financial
support or discount price). This shows that Italian households rely mainly
on their own savings for house purchase. For the sub-sample of owners of
second homes and other real estate (third panel), inter vivos transfers
account for 9.2 percent of the value of the property and total transfers
(including bequests) for 35.7 percent. The last panel refers to the whole
sample, including renters: earmarked transfers are found to account for 24.5
percent of real estate wealth.
10 A total of 96 respondents report receiving the house as a bequest or as a gift from the spouse. We
treat these assets as purchased by the household. This introduces a small bias in the computation
of the share of transfers in real estate wealth because some of the real estates transmitted to the
spouse may have been received by the donor as a bequest. Treating all inter-spousal transfers as
bequests has a minor impact on the overall share of transfers; for instance, in the last panel of
Table 1 the share rises to 26.7 percent (38.1 percent with capitalization of interest).9
T ABLE 1
T RANSFERS EARMARKED FOR HOME PURCHASE AS A SOURCE OF ACQUISITION
OF REAL ESTATE WEALTH
Incidence of transfers:
fraction of households receiving









(1) Received as a bequest 11.0 34.5 12.6
(2) Received as a gift 4.6 11.1 4.8
(3) Financial support 15.5 8.4 11.0
(4) Price discount 0.6 0.7 0.5
(5) Total fraction receiving help (a) 31.7 52.3 26.7
(6) Number of households 5,142 1,723 8,188
(a) The total does not always correspond to the sum of the numbers in the column because





First house: homeowners only (5,142 households)
(1) Purchased with own funds 128.8 79.0
(2) Received as a bequest 16.2 9.9
(3) Received as a gift 8.1 5.0
(4) Financial support 9.6 5.9
(5) Price discount 0.4 0.2
(6) Total house value 163.1 100.0
(7) Inter vivos transfers = (3)+(4)+(5) 18.1 11.1
(8) Total transfers = (2)+(3)+(4)+(5) 34.3 21.0
(9) Total capitalized transfers 49.5 30.3
Other property: owners only (1,723 households)
(1) Purchased with own funds 90.9 64.3
(2) Received as a bequest 37.4 26.5
(3) Received as a gift 9.1 6.4
(4) Financial support 3.7 2.7
(5) Price discount 0.2 0.1
(6) Total house value 141.3 100.0
(7) Inter vivos transfers = (3)+(4)+(5) 13.0 9.2
(8) Total transfers = (2)+(3)+(4)+(5) 50.4 35.7






All property: entire sample (8,188 households)
(1) Purchased with own funds 105.5 75.4
(2) Received as a bequest 19.4 13.9
(3) Received as a gift 7.4 5.3
(4) Financial support 7.2 5.2
(5) Price discount 0.3 0.2
(6) Total house value 139.8 100.0
(7) Inter vivos transfers = (3)+(4)+(5) 14.9 10.7
(8) Total transfers = (2)+(3)+(4)+(5) 34.3 24.5
(9) Total capitalized transfers 48.9 34.9
Notes. All averages are computed using sample weights. Transfers and the value of the
property are expressed in millions of 1991 lire. Property values are net of mortgage debt.
The capitalized transfers are computed assuming a 2 percent annual net real rate of return
on housing wealth.
This estimate of the share of transfer wealth counts all interest on
transfers as part of life-cycle saving, not intergenerational transfers. Thus,
24.5 percent is a lower-bound estimate of the share of transfers earmarked
for real estate. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) argue that intergenerational
transfers should also include the interest accrued on the transfer. The upper
estimate of transfer wealth of 34.9 percent is obtained by capitalizing
transfers at a net real return on housing of 2 percent.
11Since information on
the year in which the transfer is received is missing, the computation
arbitrarily assumes that earmarked transfers are received the same year as
the purchase was made.
In addition to information on how the property was financed, SHIW
respondents report the year in which the husband or wife acquired the
property and the age at first employment. This allows us to construct a
proxy for saving time and to estimate the effect of inter vivos transfers on
that variable and on the value of the house selected. One difficulty in
estimation is that saving time for renters is right censored. Ignoring renters
11 This is a relatively high value, as one must net the average annual gross real rate of return on the
housing stock (about 3 percent in the last three decades) from the tax rate on housing and subtract
from this the annual rate of depreciation of the stock of housing.11
leads to biased estimates of the effect of transfers on saving time. The
direction of such bias, however, is ambiguous because it depends on the
way that transfers affect renters' behavior. If it is the case that older renters
have not received any transfer, the effect of transfers on saving time will be
smaller in a sample of buyers. But suppose that parents offer support to their
children for housing in general (rent or purchase) and that the children then
decide whether to buy or not. In this case, excluding the right-censored
observations could increase the effect of transfers on saving time.
The survey contains information on in-kind transfers received during the
rental period in the form of free availability of parents' and relatives'
properties. A significant fraction of renters live rent-free in houses owned by
parents, relatives or friends, an important form of in-kind transfer
unambiguously earmarked for housing. We construct a measure of the
cumulative amount of such transfers by capitalizing at the annual real
interest rate of 2 percent the 1991 flow of imputed rents over the entire
period in which the household has lived in these apartments.
12
In principle, both renters and owners receive other unconditional
monetary transfers that could affect home purchase decisions. Our data do
not allow us to measure these transfers. For instance we do not know if
renters regularly receive monetary contributions to pay the rent. However,
we have good reason to believe that such transfers play a minor role. In a
typical SHIW survey not more than 2 or 3 percent of households receive
either monetary gifts or loans from relatives and friends.
13 Guiso and
Jappelli (1991) report that the fraction is similar in the 1985 Survey of
Households' Structure and Behavior carried on by the National Statistical
Institute (ISTAT). Furthermore, for households receiving unconditional
monetary transfers, renting was difficult in the 1970s and 1980s. Due to
tight rent control regulation and limits on the ability of landlords to evict
tenants at the expiration of the contract, the supply of housing in the rental
12 For an individual who has been living in such houses for t years, the total amount of in-kind
transfers received is (1-1.02t)/(1-1.02)´R, where R denote imputed rents as of 1991. Information
on the year in which the household first moved in the apartment where he/she currently lives is
also available in the 1991 SHIW, see Appendix.
13 For instance, in the 1989 Survey of Household Income and Wealth 1.7 percent of the households
surveyed received gifts or loans from relatives or friends. In 1987 the proportion was 2.6 percent.
About 20 percent of these transfers were loans, the other 80 percent gifts.12
market shrunk considerably; at the same time, a small and extremely
expensive black market emerged.
14
The main drawbacks of the earmarked transfer indicator is that we miss
the year in which the transfer was received and that rent support received
during the rental period is not observed for homeowners. A different section
of the 1991 SHIW asks each member of the household to report the year and
amount of bequests and gifts received in the past from parents or other
relatives, irrespective of whether the transfer was earmarked for home
purchase. This variable, which we denote as general transfers, is used by
Guiso and Jappelli (1996) to compute the aggregate share of transfers in
total wealth. Table 2 shows that on average each household received 50.4
million lire (equivalent to $31,500 in 1995), 24.3 percent of total net worth
(20.2 percent in bequests plus 4.1 percent in gifts). Capitalizing bequests
and gifts at a net real interest rate of 2 percent, the share of transfer wealth
comes to 35.8 percent (29.5 percent bequests plus 6.3 percent gifts). The
estimate of the share of earmarked transfers on real estate wealth reported in
Table 1 is remarkably close to that of general transfers on total wealth (real
estate plus financial assets and durable goods) reported in Table 2. This is
reassuring, given that the two sources of information are based on
completely different questions and are therefore not necessarily consistent.
However, a comparison between Table 1 and 2 also shows that general
transfers miss a considerable amount of small transfers: about 6 percent
reports receiving general transfers, as opposed to 12 percent reporting
earmarked transfers.
In sum, for general transfers we know not only transfer amounts ever
received in the past, but also the year of the transfer for both renters and
owners. The main problem is that general transfers is not as good a measure
of transfers as earmarked transfers, which is based on a detailed section of
the questionnaire on housing, stimulating people to think much harder about
14 Since the mid 1970s rents have been subject to ceilings well below the market rate. The law has
also given tenants the option of staying in the house essentially without limits. If a landlord
wanted to evict a tenant, he had to apply to court. Since 1983 only 20 percent of the applications
for eviction have been approved. Even in 1996, three years after the approval of a law that
gradually liberalizes the rental market, over a million tenants whose contract has expired have
obtained an extension. As a consequence of regulation, in the 1980s the supply of housing
available for renting essentially dried out, especially in large metropolitan areas. A small black
market with exceptionally high prices, ranging from 3 to 5 or more times the controlled rent,
developed while tenant-occupied houses sold at a discount of 30 or 40 percent of the price of
unoccupied housing.13
home purchase, and eliciting information also on price discount, help for
downpayments, and rent support. Since neither of the two indicators is
perfect, we use both in the estimation and check the sensitivity of the results
to the definition of transfers.
T ABLE 2







% of net worth
(ratio of
averages
% of net worth
(average ratio)
Transfers
Bequests 20.3 41.9 20.2 18.8
Gifts 5.6 8.5 4.1 6.0
Total transfers 25.9 50.4 24.3 24.8
Capitalized transfers
Bequests 20.3 61.2 29.5 29.4
Gifts 5.6 13.1 6.3 8.3
Total transfers 25.9 74.3 35.8 37.6
Notes. All averages are computed using sample weights and are based on the 1991 SHIW
sample of 8,188 households. Capitalized transfers are computed assuming a net real interest
rate of 2 percent. Financial assets are imputed from the flow of financial income.
4.  Empirical results
We estimate the impact of transfers on saving time restricting the sample
in several ways. The behavior of households that receive the house as a
bequest - especially if bequests are unintended - may be different from that
of the rest of the population; these households are therefore dropped.
15
Young working individuals still living as dependents with their families do
15 Also excluded are households that received the property as a bequest or as a gift from the spouse,
given that we do not know how the donor acquired the property.14
not appear as independent households in the survey.
16 Since young,
independent consumers tend to be wealthier than average, possibly thanks to
financial support from the family, householder younger than 25 at the date
of the purchase are excluded from the estimation. This final restriction thus
leads to an underestimate of the impact of transfers on saving time. On the
other hand, we do not want the results to be driven by a relatively small
number of households receiving large transfers early in life.
In principle, we would like to select only first-time buyers and
households with plans to purchase a house. Repeat buyers, in fact, face
rather different constraints in moving than renters; and households who do
not plan to purchase a house may have different preferences and/or
opportunities than the rest of the population. The information in the SHIW,
however, does not distinguish between these groups. Householders over age
55 are excluded as more likely to have moved in the past and hence to
qualify as repeat buyers. Since this limit is arbitrary, we test for the
robustness of the results using age thresholds of 50 and 40.
Also excluded are households with missing observations for the year of
home purchase (if home owners), occupation, sector of activity or
education. Since a complete series on regional house prices is available only
starting in 1967, we drop all households whose purchase was before that
year, regardless of age. After these exclusions, the sample reduces to 3,536
households, currently aged 26 to 55. Complete saving time spells are
observed for 1,825 households who purchased the house between 1967 and
1991 and older than 25 at the time of purchase. The sample also includes
1,711 renters, for which saving time is right censored.
We use several definitions of saving time. In our basic specification we
define saving time as “age at acquisition less age at first employment”:
according to the life-cycle model individuals start saving when they start to
earn income. For renters saving time spells are censored; for them saving
time is therefore “age in 1991 less age at first employment”. We experiment
with two other measures of saving time for owners: “age at acquisition less
25”, on the assumption that household formation coincides with the decision
to buy a house and with the beginning of the saving plan (25 is the median
16 In 1991 the share of income recipients under 30 years old was 19.8 percent, while the share of
household heads that young was a tiny 7.6 percent.15
age at marriage)
17; and “age at acquisition less max(years of education +6,
18)”, on the assumption that people start saving for home purchase
immediately after school. The econometric results are not affected by the
different definitions. We thus report full results of the basic specification
and a brief summary of the results using different specifications.
Saving time exhibits considerable sample variability, ranging from 1 for
those who purchased after only one year of work, to 34 for someone who
started working at age 20 and purchased at age 55. For most households
saving time is substantial, in sharp contrast to the experience of other
countries. For instance, in the United States it averages between 2 and 3
years, depending on the particular sample and definition used (Engelhardt,
1994). In contrast, among Italian homeowners, fewer than 15 percent have
saving time shorter than 3 years. As noted, this long saving time is
presumably due to limited access to credit during the 1967-91 period: most
households were prevented or discouraged from borrowing and had to rely
on accumulated savings; even when they could borrow, the downpayment
was generally higher than 50 percent.
Since we use a cross-section of households that purchased houses
between 1966 and 1991, we cannot rule out the possibility that saving time
may be contaminated by time and cohort effects. For instance, it is possible
that, given age, earlier cohorts have a shorter saving time, due to a lower
price-income ratio for housing, preferences or other effects. Cohort effects
in tenure decisions are not identified in a single cross-section.
18 To assess
the potential bias from cohort effects, we compare the cross-sectional age-
tenure profile with an estimate of the cohort-adjusted home ownership
profile.
The cohort-adjusted profile is obtained from the fitted values of a logit
regression against a fifth-order polynomial in age and 10 cohort dummies in
5-year bands (see the Appendix for details). The adjusted age profile,
plotted in Figure 1, is similar to the cross-sectional profile, except possibly
for older households, suggesting that the age profile is only slightly
contaminated by cohort effects in tenure decisions. In fact, the joint
17 Source: ISTAT, Annuario di Statistiche Demografiche (1980).
18 In principle, it would be preferable to use panel data, but detailed information on transfers
earmarked for real estate is available only in 1991.16
hypothesis that the 10 cohort dummies are equal to zero cannot be rejected
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T HE CROSS-SECTIONAL AND COHORT-ADJUSTED HOMEOWNERSHIP PROFILE
The figure plots with diamonds the cross-sectional homeownership rate by age and with
stars the cohort-adjusted profile. The cross-sectional profile is estimated by the fitted values
of a logit regression against a fifth-order polynomial in age. The data set merges 6
independent cross-sections (the 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995 SHIW), a
total of about 50,000 observations. The cohort-adjusted profile is estimated on the same
data set by the fitted values of a logit regression against a fifth-order polynomial in age and
10 cohort dummies in 5-year bands.17
Table 3 reports means for selected variables for the total sample, owners
and renters; each of these groups is further divided into transfer recipients
and non-recipients. The construction of permanent income, i.e. the average
present discounted value of households' earnings at the time of the purchase,
is described in the Appendix. We construct an index of the relative price of
housing at the time of the purchase deflating the nominal price of housing
per square meter by the consumer price index; the relative price of housing
is available starting in 1967 for 95 provinces and three types of location
(center, semi-center and outskirts). There is substantial cross-sectional and
time variation in the relative price of housing, with a strong tendency to rise
in the largest metropolitan areas (Rome, Milan, Naples), and in the second
half of the 1980s.
19
Within the group of homeowners, recipients have higher permanent
income and higher education and purchase larger and more expensive
homes than non-recipients. Saving time is about two years shorter for
recipients. A proper test, however, must control for other factors affecting
the timing of purchase, as well as for censored saving time spells. We
accordingly relate saving time to a set of personal characteristics, permanent
income and transfer amounts. House prices, area dummies and city size
indicators proxy for differences in the conditions of the local housing
markets.
Ideally, each of these conditioning variables should refer to the time of
purchase. Except for transfers and the relative price of housing, however,
the variables that we observe in the cross-section refer to 1991. Thus we
must assume that education and broad categories of sector and occupation of
the household head have remained constant since the date of purchase. We
also assume that 1991 family size proxies for the expected family size at the
time of the purchase.
19 For censored observations (renters) the relative price of housing refers to 1991; for completed
spells (owners) the price refers to the time of the purchase.18
T ABLE 3
S AMPLE CHARACTERISTICS BY HOMEOWNERSHIP AND TRANSFERS RECEIVED
Total Homeowners Renters
sample Transfer=0 Transfer>0 Transfer=0 Transfer>0
Age at purchase 37.67 35.83 33.97 40.78 37.36
Age at first employment 21.46 21.39 21.73 21.42 21.40
Saving time 16.23 14.45 12.26 19.36 15.96
Home value -.- 180.80 188.7 -.- -.-
Demographics
Education 9.79 9.67 10.73 9.53 9.83
Male 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.91
Family size 3.55 3.69 3.61 3.46 3.28
Sector
Agriculture 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08
Industry 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.36 0.29
Service 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.32
Public Administration 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.33 0.31
Occupation
Laborer 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.42 0.36
Clerical 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.27 0.29
Manager, professional,
entrepreneur
0.13 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.08
Self-employed 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.27
to  be continued19
Total Homeowners Renters
sample Transfer=0 Transfer>0 Transfer=0 Transfer>0
Regional dummies and
prices
North 0.42 0.43 0.35 0.47 0.29
Centre 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.17 0.22
South 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.49
Relative price of housing 2.05 1.64 1.71 2.52 2.18
City size
< 10,000 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.23
10,000-100,000 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.29
100,000-500,000 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.49 0.38
> 500,000 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.10
Resources
Permanent income 31.41 32.84 33.54 29.71 29.46
Transfers for home
purchase
19.07 0.00 88.70 67.38 0.00
Observations 3,536 1,275 550 1,434 277
Notes. For owners, saving time is defined as age at acquisition less age at first employment.
For renters, age at acquisition is replaced by current age. Observations excluded are:
households not reporting the year of acquisition or the value of the house (if homeowner),
those with heads currently younger than 25 or older than 55, those that purchased the house
before 1967, those that received the house as a bequest, and those with missing values for
occupation or sector. The real price of housing (per square meter, deflated by the CPI),
permanent income and transfers are expressed in millions of 1991 lire.
Table 4 reports basic information on saving time. For our survival
analysis, buying a house is considered a “failure” and remaining a tenant is
“survival”. We also report the cumulative failure function, i.e. the
probability of purchasing a house within any time interval. The median of
this distribution is the value corresponding to 0.5021 of the failure function
(20 years). It is worth noticing that this estimate of the median of the20
distribution of saving time spells takes right-censoring into account. The last
column of Table 4 reports the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard
function, i.e. the non-parametric estimates of the probability of buying in
any time interval. This is defined as the number of buyers in any time
interval divided by the population of renters in that period. The hazard,
which is plotted in Figure 2, increases slowly up to time 25; afterwards, it
exhibits some noise, with an apparent decline between t=25 and  t=30, and a
further increase for the longest saving spells. The shape of the hazard points
to the importance of allowing for duration dependence; the declining hazard
between  t=25 and t=30 also shows that such dependence may be non-
monotonic. Thus, in the empirical estimates we will allow for the most
flexible specification of the hazard rate.
We relate the hazard rate h(t) to a set of observable characteristics by
estimating a Cox proportional hazard model of the form:
h(t) = ho(t) exp(X'b)
where ho(t) is the baseline hazard rate at time t for the covariate vector o, b a
vector of coefficients and X a matrix of observable variables. The model
assumes only that h(t)/ho(t) is constant over time. The advantage of this
semiparametric estimator is that no assumption is made with respect to the
baseline hazard. The drawback, of course, is that it only estimates a hazard
rate, not the quantitative impact of an independent variable on saving time.21
T ABLE 4




















1 3,536 34 10 0.0096 0.0096
2 3,492 16 10 0.0142 0.0046
3 3,466 33 10 0.0235 0.0095
4 3,423 37 10 0.0341 0.0108
5 3,376 36 18 0.0444 0.0107
6 3,322 86 44 0.0691 0.0259
7 3,192 94 54 0.0965 0.0294
8 3,044 101 44 0.1265 0.0332
9 2,899 105 66 0.1582 0.0362
10 2,728 124 71 0.1964 0.0455
11 2,533 101 75 0.2285 0.0399
12 2,357 105 67 0.2628 0.0445
13 2,185 98 79 0.2959 0.0449
14 2,008 87 65 0.3264 0.0433
15 1,856 100 62 0.3627 0.0539
16 1,694 77 62 0.3917 0.0455
17 1,555 77 55 0.4218 0.0495
18 1,423 54 47 0.4437 0.0379
19 1,322 68 65 0.4723 0.0514
20 1,189 67 50 0.5021 0.0563
21 1,072 55 74 0.5276 0.0513
22 943 45 57 0.5502 0.0477
23 841 43 74 0.5732 0.0511
24 724 37 53 0.5950 0.0511
25 634 36 61 0.6180 0.0568
26 537 28 58 0.6379 0.0521
27 451 21 40 0.6548 0.0466
28 390 15 41 0.6680 0.0385
29 334 13 50 0.6810 0.0389
30 271 7 44 0.6892 0.0258
31 220 10 51 0.7033 0.0455
32 159 7 41 0.7164 0.0440
33 111 7 35 0.7343 0.0631
34 35 1 40 0.7381 0.0145
Notes. For owners, saving time is defined as age at acquisition less age at first employment.
For renters, age at acquisition is replaced by current age. The table displays the number of
households entering each time interval j (nj), the number of households that have purchased
a house after j years (dj) and the number of renters observed in each time interval (mj). The
cumulative failure function is defined as one minus the cumulative survival function, i.e.
the probability that an individual in interval j survives to interval j+1. The hazard rate is the
probability of purchasing after j years conditional on not having purchased before j.22
Saving time
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T HE HAZARD RATE
The figure plots three alternative estimates of the hazard rate (the probability of purchasing
a house in interval j conditional on not having purchased a house before j) against saving
time. The dots represent the empirical hazard rate as estimated in Table 3. The broken line
is the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the baseline hazard from the Cox proportional hazard
model reported in Table 4. The line with triangles is the baseline hazard estimated by the
Weibull regression in Table 4. This is computed as lop(lop)p-1, where lo=(1/M)(ln 2)1/p
and M is the median of the survival distribution (Greene, 1993, p. 720).
The results are reported in Table 5. The coefficients measure how the
logarithm of the relative hazard h(t)/ho(t) is affected by a unit change in the
explanatory variable.
20 Thus, a positive coefficient indicates that the effect
of the variable is to increase the hazard, and therefore to reduce saving time.
Saving time is lower for men and falls with education. Larger households
20  It may be easier to interpret the coefficients in terms of hazard ratios, rather than in terms of the
log of the hazard rate, i.e. exp(b) rather than b. For instance, for education, the hazard estimate in
Table 4 is 1.051, i.e. each year of education increases the relative hazard by 5.1 percent.23
have longer saving time spells, presumably because, other things being
equal, a larger family requires a more expensive home. The sector,
occupation, regional and area dummies are not significantly different from
zero. Households living in the Center and in the South have shorter saving
time than those living in the North. For residents of large metropolitan areas
saving time is significantly longer than for small towns and rural areas.
T ABLE 5
T HE DETERMINANTS OF SAVING TIME. FULL SAMPLE ESTIMATES






Education 0.0534 0.0078 0.0587 0.0077
Male 0.2746 0.1074 0.2978 0.1075
Family size -0.0423 0.0225 -0.0446 0.0224
Sector
Agriculture 0.0328 0.1203 -0.0049 0.1203
Service 0.0672 0.0632 0.0362 0.0632
Public Administration 0.0382 0.0641 0.0653 0.0640
Occupation
Clerical 0.0382 0.0735 0.0399 0.0736
Manager, professional,
entrepreneur
0.0883 0.0964 0.0953 0.0962
Self-employed 0.1023 0.0728 0.1084 0.0728
Regional dummies and prices
Centre 0.2994 0.0658 0.3093 0.0658
South 0.3245 0.0628 0.3327 0.0627
Relative price of housing -0.6507 0.0393 -0.6713 0.0396
City size
< 10,000 0.0522 0.0868 0.0749 0.0868
10,000-100,000 -0.0989 0.0829 -0.0886 0.0828
100,000-500,000 -0.2334 0.0732 -0.2359 0.0731
to be continued24






Permanent income 0.0101 0.0034 0.0093 0.0034
Transfers 0.0023 0.0003 0.0023 0.0003
Duration parameter (ln p) -.- -.- 0.6330 0.0199
c
2 (17) 699.80 746.15
Total observations 3,536 3,536
Censored observations 1,711 1,711
Median of the survival
distribution
20 20
Notes. The coefficients indicate the effect of the independent variables on the logarithm of
the relative hazard, l(t)/lo(t). For the Cox model the base hazard is estimated non-
parametrically (see Figure 2). For the Weibull model the base hazard is tp-1, where p is the
estimated shape parameter. For owners, saving time is defined as age at acquisition less age
at first employment. For renters, age at acquisition is replaced by age in 1991. Observations
excluded from the estimation are: households not reporting the year of acquisition or the
value of the house, households with heads currently younger than 25 or older than 55, those
that purchased the house before 1967, those that received the house as a bequest, and those
with missing values for occupation or sector. The real price of housing, permanent income
and transfers are expressed in millions of 1991 lire. Attributes excluded from the
regressions are: employed in the industrial sector, operatives, resident in the North, living in
cities over 500,000 inhabitants. The Weibull regression also includes a constant term.
The effect of permanent income on saving time should depend on the
nature of borrowing constraints. Greater resources increase the size of the
house that the consumer wants to buy and stimulate higher borrowing:
saving time will thus increase if there is an absolute limit on borrowing, or
decrease if mortgage availability is proportional to income. The estimated
coefficient of permanent income is positive and significantly different from
zero, suggesting that higher permanent income is associated with shorter
saving time, other things equal. The relative price of housing is an important
determinant of saving time. Increasing the real price of housing by 1 million
lire per square meter - about one standard deviation away from the mean -
reduces the hazard ratio by exp(-0.657)=51.8 percent.25
The coefficient of transfers is positive and is very precisely estimated.
Thus transfers reduce saving time, confirming the descriptive analysis of
Table 2. The average transfer is about 80 million (see Table 3). Receiving
an 80-million-lira transfer increases the hazard rate by 20 percent,
exp(80´0.0023)=1.20.
The baseline hazard of the Cox model can be estimated non-
parametrically as a weighted Kaplan-Meier estimator (Kalbfleisch and
Prentice, 1980, p. 84-87). This is plotted in Figure 2 as a broken line. This
conditional hazard rate is seen to track the unconditional hazard estimated
with the raw data quite well: controlling for the covariates does not greatly
affect the unconditional hazard, and confirms that saving time is
characterized by (possibly non-monotonic) duration dependence. In the case
at hand, an increasing hazard agrees with intuition. The housing market is
characterized by borrowing constraints and indivisibilities in purchases. If a
house can only be purchased by accumulating own savings, then only a very
good but unlikely realization of income or a significant drop in house prices
allow early purchase. Chances of meeting the minimum price, and thus
buying, increase with time because savings accumulate. The temporary fall
in the hazard rate after t=25 reflects either noise, or the fact that older
households are increasingly discouraged from buying.
21
Until t=25 the estimated hazard is relatively smooth, so that for the entire
sample a Weibull parametrization of the hazard rate may not be
inappropriate. The Weibull model assumes a parametric form for the
baseline hazard, i.e. ho(t)=t
p-1
, where p is the shape parameter, indicating
whether the baseline hazard is constant (p=1), increasing (p>1), or
decreasing (p<1). The results are also displayed in Table 5 It is seen that the
coefficients estimated by the Cox model are very close to the Weibull
coefficients. In particular, we obtain the same estimate (up to the fourth
decimal point) for the coefficient of transfers. The baseline hazard,
evaluated at the median of the survival distribution, is also plotted in Figure
2, confirming that for a wide range of saving time the Weibull
parametrization describes duration dependence quite well.
21 The coefficient estimates and the baseline hazard obtained with the Cox model are very similar to
those estimated by the ordered logit semi-parametric estimator for duration data proposed by Han
and Hausman (1990). For brevity the ordered logit estimates are not reported.26
As mentioned, one interpretation of duration dependence is that
borrowing constraints force households to save prior to purchase. Yet other
interpretations of the shape parameter cannot be ruled out. Lancaster (1979)
and Kiefer (1988) point out that p is, at least in part, an index of
specification error, measuring the extent of unrecognized heterogeneity of
our sample of individuals. Unobserved characteristics of households, such
as attitudes toward savings or preference for home ownership rather than
renting, would have such an effect.
A standard test for heterogeneity of the individual survival distributions










, and 1/q  is the variance of the gamma
distribution (Greene, 1993, p. 724). In the absence of heterogeneity (q=0),
the hazard reduces to the Weibull model. The hypothesis is not rejected in
our regression because we obtain small and insignificant values for q; the
estimates of the other coefficients are not affected. The result is of course
valid only if heterogeneity can be parametrized in the survival distribution
in this very specific way.
The Weibull coefficients allow us to assess the quantitative impact of
transfers on saving time. The first panel of Table 6 reproduces the transfer
coefficient of the basic specification of Table 5 An 80-million-lira transfer
decreases saving time by 10.5 percent. Evaluated at the median of the
survival distribution (20 years), this implies a cut in saving time of 2.1
years. As will be seen, this result holds for different sample definitions and
alternative measures of saving time, and when one takes into account the
potential endogeneity of transfers.
5.  Sensitivity of the estimates
The assumption that our selected sample includes only first-time buyers
is a rather strong one. Unfortunately, we lack the information needed to
distinguish repeat-buyers; but under our assumption if, say, a 55 year-old
who started working at age 25 has just moved to a new house, selling the
old one, saving time is automatically set equal to 30. Thus, saving time may
overestimate the renting period, especially for the oldest portion of the
sample; of course the problem is less serious for young households, whose
probability of being repeat buyers is low.27
The second panel in Table 6 explores the sensitivity of the results when
households headed by individuals older than 40 are excluded (for brevity, in
this and the following cases only the transfer coefficient is reported). The
main results are unaffected: evaluated at the median, an 80-million-lira




T HE EFFECT OF TRANSFERS ON SAVING TIME. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Specification Cox model Weibull
model
Basic specification
Coefficient of transfers 0.0022 0.0022
Standard error 0.0003 0.0003
Effect of an 80-million-lira transfer 0.0940
Number of observations: 3,536. Censored:1,711. Median S:20
Excluding age> 40
Coefficient of transfers 0.0022 0.0023
Standard error 0.0004 0.0004
Effect of 80-million-lira transfer 0.0920
Number of observations: 1,382. Censored: 867. Median S: 17
Excluding purchases before 1985
Coefficient of transfers 0.0026 0.0027
Standard error 0.0004 0.0003
Effect of 80-million-lira transfer 0.1050
Number of observations: 2,437. Censored: 1,711. Median S: 31
Excluding extended families
Coefficient of transfers 0.0022 0.0022
Standard error 0.0003 0.0003
Effect of 80-million-lira transfer 0.0950
Number of observations: 3,274. Censored: 1,593. Median S: 20
Excluding loan-to-value ratio>0.2
Coefficient of transfers 0.0022 0.0022
Standard error 0.0003 0.0003
Effect of 80-million-lira transfer 0.0950
Number of observations: 3,362. Censored: 1,711. Median S: 21
to be continued
22  Similar results are obtained excluding households with heads older than 45 years.28
Specification Cox model Weibull
model
Saving time = age at purchase - max [years of education+6; 18]
Coefficient of transfers 0.0025 0.0026
Standard error 0.0003 0.0003
Effect of an 80-million-lira transfer 0.0890
Number of observations: 3,536. Censored: 1,711. Median S: 23
Time varying regressors
Coefficient of transfers 0.0012
Standard error 0.0004
Number of observations: 48,972
Notes: The table reports the effect on saving time of increasing transfers by 80 million lire
(about the average transfer received by home buyers). The effect is computed as 80´(b/p),
where b is the estimated coefficient of transfers and p the estimated shape parameter in the
Weibull regressions. Transfers are measured in millions of 1991 lire. The medians of the
survival distributions are adjusted for right-censoring.
The estimates may suffer from a different selection bias. The relatively
elderly householders that acquired homes early on (say, in 1967) report
relatively short saving times (to be included in the sample such a household
must have purchased a house when the head was relatively young). Thus,
restricting the sample to the relatively young tends, by construction, to bias
downward the estimated saving time because the age distribution of home
acquisition around 1967 is truncated to the right. This selection of older
householders into the shorter saving time brackets may interact with the
regressors.
This problem is compounded by our implicit assumption that access to
credit does not vary over time. As mentioned, increased borrowing capacity
generally reduces saving time. Even if few households had access to credit
over the period 1967-91, as witnessed by the low level of mortgage loans,
the unobserved variability of credit ceilings over time and across households
may affect saving behavior and the reliability of the estimates.
23
23 Average saving time for households with outstanding mortgage loans does not differ significantly
from that for households without mortgages. However, this comparison is not entirely
appropriate, because current outstanding mortgage loans convey little information on the29
We perform several experiments to explore how the sample construction
and unobserved credit market conditions might affect the estimates. We
restrict the sample to the 726 most recent buyers (1985-1991). Since this
drops a disproportionate number of short saving times, the median of the
distribution is higher (31 years). The effect of transfers, however, is not
greatly affected, as is shown in Table 6. Nor are the basic results changed by
excluding households with outstanding mortgage debt greater than 20
percent of the value of the house (174 observations).
For several reasons, extended families, i.e. households sharing living
arrangements with parents or other relatives, may behave differently from
nuclear families. Intergenerational transfers from the elderly to the young
may take place within the extended family but they are not recorded in the
survey since only transfers received by the household from outside are
reported.
24 The transfers recorded in the survey may have been received by
a parent living in the extended family, and may have affected their home
purchase decision while being totally unrelated to the decision of the
younger household head. The intergenerational links may be different in
extended families.
25 Finally, in these households it is not at all obvious who
is the decision maker. We check the sensitivity of the estimates when 262
extended families are dropped from the sample. As is shown in Table 6, the
effect of transfers for nuclear families are similar to those obtained in the
full sample estimates.
26
Another criticism of our estimates is that we do not properly control for
the timing of transfers and, more generally, for the possibility of time-
varying regressors. As mentioned in Section 3, in case of general transfers
we know not only the amount, but also the year in which the transfer was
received. This allows us to estimate a Cox proportional hazard model with
mortgage that was granted at the time of the purchase and also because many mortgages finance
home improvements or repairs and may be granted long after the purchase.
24 Ando, Guiso and Terlizzese (1994) use the panel component of the 1987 and 1989 SHIW and
show that movements of elderly persons into and out of younger households have strong effects
on the households' net worth.
25 Furthermore, the composition of extended families is more likely to have changed since the time
of the purchase.
26 If saving time is defined as “age at acquisition less 20” or as “age at acquisition less max(years of
education+6, 18)” the effect of receiving an 80-million-lira transfer is also about 2 years.30
time varying regressors.
27 Using the same sample and specification as in
Table 4, we find that receiving an 80 million transfer increases the hazard by
12 percent. The effect is somewhat attenuated with respect to the baseline
specification. Howeever, the difference between the two sets of coefficients
reflects not only the difference between the two estimation procedures, but
also between the different measures of transfers (recall that in Table 4 we
lack information on the timing of transfers).
All estimates presented so far may also be affected by bias arising from
the endogeneity of transfers. In fact, donor's decisions may partly depend on
recipients' behavior. The direction of this bias is ambiguous a priori. For
instance, suppose that households with strong desire to purchase a house
(and therefore short saving time) deliberately ask for more transfers from
their parents and take successful actions to trigger the transfer decision. This
behavior would imply a negative correlation between saving time and
transfers. Alternatively, consider a household with relatively long saving
time; if long saving time signals poor resources, then parents may give more
to their less fortunate children. This will produce a positive correlation
between saving time and transfers.
Controlling for the endogeneity bias requires a model of transfers, i.e.
information on donors' resources and characteristics. Since the 1991 SHIW
does not contain such information, we rely on the 1991 sub-sample that was
also interviewed in 1993. The 1993 SHIW lacks data on transfers earmarked
for real estate but has data on the educational attainment, sector and
occupation of the parents, sisters and brothers of the household head and
spouse, and information on the income of the household interviewed relative
to that of the parents.
The coefficients in Table 7 are based on two-stage estimation. Using a
Tobit regression, in the first stage we relate transfer amounts to the same
variables included in the second stage and to proxies for the recipients'
27 For brevity, this additional set of results are available on request. The effect of permanent income
is also similar with respect to the estimates reported in Table 4. The effect of house prices is
instead considerably attenuated. Increasing the real house price by 1 million lire per square meter
(about one standard deviation from the mean) reduces the hazard by only 20 percent. The reason
is that in this specification we explicitly take into account that house prices is a time-varying
regressor, i.e. prices vary by year, province, and house type. Using time-varying regressors and
general transfers we perform a similar sensitivity analysis as described in this section (excluding
age greater than 40, purchases before 1985, extended households, etc.), and in all cases the effect
of transfers is not much affected.31
characteristics, donors' resources and dummies for the presence of brothers
and sisters outside the household.
28 Our identification assumption is that
transfers are the only channel between parents' characteristics (or income)
and saving time. This assumption rules out, for instance, that a family with a
taste for thrift and a high income induces children to reduce saving time
independently from transfers.
T ABLE 7
T HE EFFECT OF TRANSFERS ON SAVING TIME: 1991-93 PANEL






Education 0.0122 0.0143 0.0142 0.0143
Male 0.1031 0.1664 0.1049 0.1662
Family size -0.0156 0.0384 -0.0141 0.0381
Sector
Agriculture -0.1121 0.1804 -0.1250 0.1807
Service 0.0443 0.0974 0.0395 0.0975
Public Administration 0.1138 0.0947 0.1085 0.0944
Occupation
Clerical 0.0127 0.1064 0.0121 0.1065
Manager, professional, entrepreneur 0.0571 0.1437 0.0626 0.1433
Self-employed -0.0394 0.1116 -0.0441 0.1118
Regional dummies and prices
Centre 0.1420 0.1109 0.1324 0.1107
South 0.2977 0.0983 0.3015 0.0977
Relative price of housing -0.5033 0.0559 -0.5116 0.0563
City size
< 10,000 -0.1686 0.1548 -0.1616 0.1550
10,000-100,000 -0.3365 0.1514 -0.3323 0.1514
100,000-500,000 -0.3290 0.1307 -0.3281 0.1307
to be continued
28 The complete list of variables included in the first stage is reported at the bottom of Table 7. First-
stage results are not reported for brevity.32






Permanent income 0.0095 0.0050 0.0086 0.0049
Transfers 0.0038 0.0011 0.0042 0.0012
Duration parameter (ln p) -.- -.- 0.634 0.0279
c
2 (17) 265.96 285.12
Total observations 1,557 1,557
Censored observations 706 706
Median of the survival distribution 20 20
Effect of an 80-million-lira transfer 0.1782
Notes. The coefficients measure the effect of the independent variables on the logarithm of
the relative hazard, h(t)/ho. For the Cox model the base hazard is estimated non-
parametrically. For the Weibull model the base hazard is t
p-1
, where p is the estimated shape
parameter. The regressions use the predicted transfer amounts from a first stage Tobit
regression. The first stage includes all variables of the second stage regressions, dummies
for the educational achievement of the household head and of the spouse, dummies for the
income of the head's and spouse's parents relative to that of the household; dummies for the
occupation of the heads' parents, and dummies for the presence of brothers and sisters
outside the household. Standard errors are not corrected for two-stage estimation. For
owners, saving time is defined as age at acquisition less age at first employment. For
renters, age at acquisition is replaced by age in 1991. Observations excluded from the
estimation are: households not interviewed in 1993, households not reporting the year of
acquisition or the value of the house, households with heads currently younger than 25 or
older than 55, those that purchased the house before 1967, those that received the house as
a bequest, and those with missing values for occupation or sector. The real price of housing,
permanent income and transfers are expressed in millions of 1991 lire. Attributes excluded
from the regressions are: employed in the industrial sector, operatives, resident in the
North, living in cities over 500,000 inhabitants.
The results of the Cox and Weibull models are again similar. At the
median, the effect of an 80-million-lira transfer is 17.8 percent, i.e. 3.56
years. Conditional on the validity of our instruments, this shows that taking
the potential endogeneity of transfers into account leads to an upward
revision of the effect of transfers on saving time. As we note above, one
interpretation of the result is that households with long saving times self-
select them into the large transfer group.33
6. The effect of transfers on home value
As noted in Section 2, there are several possible uses of transfers: to
reduce own savings (and possibly purchase sooner), to increase the size of
the house and to reduce borrowing. We test the relative importance of these
possibilities by regressing the 1991 value of the house against a set of
demographic variables, permanent income and the amount of transfers
received (expressed in 1991 lire). Since renters have not yet purchased a
house, the coefficients are estimated by Tobit, and renters are treated as
censored observations.
The results are reported in Table 8. Each additional lira of permanent
income increases the value of the house purchased by about 4 lire. Each lira
of transfers increases the value of the house by 0.7 lire (with a t-ratio of 10),
thus reducing own savings by 0.3 lire. The results excluding householders
older than 40 and restricting the sample to post-1985 buyers suggest an even
larger impact on the value of the home (the coefficients of transfers are 0.82
and 0.89, respectively), and implicitly a smaller effect on own savings.
Can the effect of transfers on saving time be reconciled with the effect on
house value? In 1991 average annual saving for renters is about 8 million
lire.
29 Ruling out mortgage markets and assuming zero interest rate, for a
household that is saving 8 million lire a year to purchase a house worth 80
million lire in 10 years, a transfer of 80 million lire (about the average
transfer for recipients) makes it possible to buy a house worth 80 million
immediately, a house of 160 million in 10 years or any feasible intermediate
combination. Now suppose that the household purchases a house for 144
million lire (64 million of own savings + 80 million in transfers) in 8 years.
Regressing saving time on transfers would indicate an effect of about 2
years (as in Table 4), and regressing the value of the house a coefficient
(i.e., the change in the value of the house divided by the change in transfers)
of 0.8, close to the point estimates reported in Table 8. This shows that the
two sets of estimates in Tables 4 and 8 are broadly consistent.
29 Average disposable income and consumption for renters between age 25 and 55 are respectively
34.5 and 26.7 million lire, resulting in saving of 7.8 million lire and a propensity to save of 22.6
percent.34
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Education -1.79 1.24 0.80 1.43 2.72 2.08
Male 26.13 15.25 42.27 17.09 44.96 24.70
Family size 9.53 3.59 12.17 4.10 1.22 5.92
Sector
Agriculture -3.23 19.13 -3.98 23.19 32.14 31.40
Service -11.12 9.95 -24.47 11.17 -13.56 16.43
Public Administration -10.82 10.22 -13.26 11.44 -26.86 16.88
Occupation
Clerical 38.93 11.54 52.49 13.04 27.23 19.23
Manager, professional, entrepreneurs 56.99 15.43 57.09 17.35 39.42 25.30
Self-employed 41.35 11.36 44.88 12.92 28.66 19.15
Region
Centre 30.88 10.39 6.42 11.78 -16.66 17.95
South 8.98 9.99 6.83 11.31 9.13 16.53
City size
< 10,000 -4.39 13.07 -17.06 14.82 30.88 22.35
10,000-100,000 -13.94 12.38 -11.89 14.05 19.12 20.90
100,000-500,000 -20.21 10.68 14.66 12.21 30.94 17.62
Resources
Permanent income 4.63 0.56 4.30 0.64 5.79 0.95
Transfers 0.70 0.06 0.82 0.07 0.89 0.09
Total observations 3,536 1,382 2,437
Censored observations 1,711 867 1,711
Dependent variable mean (if owner) 183.18 165.38 177.96
Notes. The value of the house, permanent income and transfers are expressed in millions of
1991 lire. Observations excluded from the estimation are: households not reporting the year
of acquisition or the value of the house (if homeowners), households with heads younger
than 25 or older than 55 (40 in the second regression), those that purchased the house
before 1967 (1985 in the third regression), those that received the house as a bequest, and
those with missing values for occupation or sector. Excluded attributes are: employed in the
industrial sector, operatives, resident in the North, living in cities over 500,000 inhabitants.
Each regression also includes a constant term.35
Our results indicate that the main effect of transfers is to increase the
value of the house, not to shorten saving time. One way to explain this
pattern is that donors act in a paternalistic way. Hall (1986) conjectures that
family members often have the means to alleviate the borrowing constraints
faced by their less fortunate relatives, but speculates that they rarely do so
because families remain paternalistic long after their offspring reach
adulthood. Parents do not let their young adult children consume out of their
future income until they have proven themselves. For instance, they may be
willing to help their children only once the latter have demonstrated the
ability to save. To guarantee that the parents' objective is fulfilled, transfers
should take place at the end of the saving period, once the potential home
buyer has established a reputation for saving. Such behavior would be
consistent with a small effect of transfers on saving time and a rather strong
effect on the size of the house. Information on the exact timing of earmarked
transfers (beginning, end or some intermediate stage of the saving program)
is not available in the SHIW. A full understanding of the connection
between home ownership and transfer motives could be obtained only from
specific surveys containing data on the timing of transfers and offering
detailed information on donors as well as recipients.
7. Conclusions
Bequests and inter vivos transfers are of considerable importance in
home purchases: more than a third of Italian homeowners report having
gotten the house itself as a gift or bequest or having received financial
support in making the purchase. The share of total real estate wealth
accounted for by earmarked transfers ranges from 25 to 35 percent,
depending on the assumption about capitalization of transfers.
Regression estimates indicate that gifts and other inter vivos transfers
earmarked for home buying shorten the saving period before home
ownership and increase the value of the house purchased. In particular, a
transfer of 100 million lire cuts saving time by about two years and
increases the value of the house purchased by 60 to 70 million lire. Overall,
these results are consistent with parents behaving in a paternalistic way,
deliberately deferring the transfer to the end of the saving period in order to
avoid negative incentive effects on the children's propensity to save.36
Borrowing constraints reduce the consumption of the young, the average
age at which people start saving and the aggregate saving rate. In principle,
transfers earmarked for home purchase can shorten saving time, smooth
recipients' consumption and weaken the saving-growth correlation. In
practice, relatively few households receive help for home purchase; most
rely entirely on own saving. And even among those who do receive help,
transfers have a small effect on saving time. Overall, our results indicate that
gifts are a poor substitute for efficient credit markets. On the basis of this
finding, mortgage market imperfections remain a potentially powerful
explanation of the high Italian aggregate saving rate and of its positive
correlation with the rate of economic growth.37
Appendix
Survey questions and definition of variables
A. Questions used to compute the share of earmarked transfers in real
estate wealth
For each property, owned in full or in part, the following questions are
asked
1. What is the share of the property owned by your household?
2.1 How did you acquire the property? (Purchased from parents or
grandparents; purchased from other relatives; purchased from
individuals, purchased from business; built by self; inherited from
spouse; inherited from parents; inherited from others; received as a gift
from spouse; received as a gift from parents; received as a gift from
others).
2.2 In case the property was purchased from parents, grandparents or
relatives, the property was purchased at market price? purchased below
market price? If so, by what percentage of the price?
2.3 In case the house was purchased from individuals or business or built
by self, how large was the financial contribution of parents and other
relatives as a fraction of the purchase price (and, if any, of expenses
relative to repairs and improvements)?
2.4 In case the house was inherited or received as a gift, did you pay
inheritance taxes ? if yes, how much as a percentage of the value of the
property?
3. When did you acquire this property?
B. The real price index for housing
The nominal price index for housing is drawn from the series provided
by Il Consulente Immobiliare and kindly made available to us by Francesco38
Nucci. The series measures the price of housing per square meter at the end
of each half-year; it is available for 95 provinces and 3 categories of housing
from 1967 to 1991. We use the end-of-period price for each year as the
representative price for the year of purchase. The nominal price is deflated
with the consumer price index (base 1991 = 100).
C. Permanent income
Permanent income is defined as the average present discounted value of
the stream of future earnings. As in King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982),
permanent income is estimated in two steps. Normal earnings are defined as
the fitted value of a reduced form equation for the log of earnings, net of
taxes and social security contributions. A first stage probit equation takes
into account the probability of labor force participation and corrects for
selection bias. Households with earnings above 5 million lire are assumed to
participate in the labor force. The probit equation for participation includes
two dummies for age (under 30 and over 50) and dummies for marital
status, number of children, education and region. The reduced form for
earnings includes a third-order polynomial in age, five dummies for
schooling (none, elementary, junior high school, high school, university),
marital status, occupation (operative and laborer; clerical; professional,
manager and entrepreneur; self-employed), sector (agriculture; industry;
services; public administration), 18 regional dummies, and the selectivity
variable. The estimates are conducted on a sample that excludes households
with heads older than 60 years.
Permanent income is then calculated by standardizing the fitted values of
the reduced form regression for earnings at age 43 (the average age of
household heads in the sample) and assuming that over the working life
earnings grow at the constant productivity growth rate g; future earnings are
then discounted at the constant rate r. It is assumed that the growth rate and
the real interest rate are equal; this assumption is convenient because it
implies that growth and discount rates “cancel each other out”, and that
permanent income is independent of the retirement age.
The procedure implies that each cohort's income is (1+g) times that of the
previous cohort. Controlling fully for the possible bias arising from cohort
effects requires a large number of cross-sections. As explained in the text,39
information on transfers as a source of home acquisition is only available in
the 1991 SHIW.
D. The cross-sectional and cohort-adjusted home ownership profiles
To estimate the cohort-adjusted home ownership profile we rely on a
series of repeated cross-sections used by Jappelli (1998) in an analysis of
wealth decumulation after retirement. The data set includes the 1984, 1986,
1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993 SHIW, a total of 44,792 observations. Year-
cohort dummies are defined as follows: cohort 1 includes all households
whose head was born between 1910 and 1914, cohort 2 those born between
1915 and 1919, and so on up to cohort 10, those born between 1955 and
1959. Households headed by persons born before 1910 or after 1959 are
excluded. Also excluded are households with missing disposable income,
disposable income or consumption less than 1 million lire or missing
information for home ownership. The final sample covers 39,939
households.
The cross-sectional profile in Figure 1 is estimated by the fitted values of
a probit regression on a constant and a fifth-order polynomial in age,
treating all observations as a large cross-section. To obtain the cohort-
adjusted profile we supplement the basic specifications with cohort and time
dummies. Since age, cohort and time are perfectly collinear variables, we
estimate the regression excluding the dummy for the oldest cohort and
requiring that the year dummies be orthogonal to a time trend and sum to
zero (Deaton and Paxson, 1994). The representative age-wealth profile
(common to all cohorts) is plotted with triangles in Figure 1. Introducing the
sex of the household head, regional dummies, and dummies for self-
employment, schooling and family size as additional regressors does not
greatly affect either the cross-sectional or the cohort-adjusted profile.40
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